Functionalism
According to functionalism, what defines a mental state is its function.
For any mental state, there is a functional role that defines it. For example, belief that it is raining is defined as the state that causes us to take an umbrella with us if we are going outside, fetch washing from the washing line if we have left any out there, etc. Any state that fulfils this functional role counts as a belief that it is raining.
Functionalism is distinct from behaviourism because whereas behaviourism holds that a mental state is identical with facts about behaviour, functionalism holds that a mental state is the state that explains facts about behaviour.
Functionalism sits well with the multiple realisability thesis, which holds that mental states can take many forms. Because functionalism is only interested in functional role as the defining feature of mentality, any state that plays the appropriate functional role will do. This means, for example, that a machine whose hardware causes it to act in appropriate ways is no less conscious than a human being whose brain causes them to act in appropriate ways.
The most famous objection to functionalism is John Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment.
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